Many researchers have been strongly influenced by Karl Popper’s idea of falsificationism. In fact, one often hears that falsificationism is a (if not the) defining feature of the scientific method. Is it? For those who are open to a different understanding of scientific methods (plural), I recommend the following:
Birkhead, T. 2008. In praise of fishing trips. Times Higher Education, July 31st.
Cleland, C.E. 2001. Historical science, experimental science, and the scientific method. Geology 29: 987-990.
Cleland, C.E. 2002. Historical science, experimental science, and the scientific method: reply to Kilty. Geology 30: 951-952.
Cleland, C.E. 2002. Methodological and epistemic differences between historical science and experimental science. Philosophy of Science 69: 474-496.
Glass, D.J. and N. Hall. 2008. A brief history of the hypothesis. Cell 134: 378-381.
Hansson, S.O. 2006. Falsificationism falsified. Foundations of Science 11: 275-286.
Hull, D.L. 1999. The use and abuse of Sir Karl Popper. Biology and Philosophy 14: 481-504.
I tend to agree with Feyerabend: Popperianism is hunky-dory in theory but in real scientific practice, clearly, “anything goes”.